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Abstract	  	  In	   the	   broad	   context	   of	   responsible	   management,	   and	   corporate	   responsibility,	   the	  present	   paper	   studies	   the	   general	   issue	   of	   conflicts	   between	   private	   investors,	   and	  governments,	  with	  a	  particular	   focus	  on	   the	   investor-­‐state	  dispute	   settlement	   through	  international	   arbitration.	   On	   the	   grounds	   of	   empirical	   research	   published	   by	   other	  scholars,	   particularly	   by	   Susan	   D.	   Franck,	   and	   Barbara	   Koremenos,	   the	   paper	   aims	   at	  explaining	   theoretically	   the	   underlying	   economic	   motives	   of	   the	   recent	   surge	   in	   the	  number	  of	  internationally	  arbitrated,	  investor-­‐state	  disputes,	  and	  at	  predicting	  its	  future	  developments.	  Additionally,	  the	  theoretical	  findings	  are	  applied	  to	  evaluate	  some	  of	  the	  possible,	   institutional	  outcomes	  of	  the	  prospective	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Partnership.	  The	  general	  conclusion	  is	  that	  not	  only	  isn’t	  the	  international	  arbitration	  of	  investor-­‐state	  disputes	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy,	  but	  also	  said	  arbitration	  helps	  to	  redress	  past	  infringements	  to	  public	  sovereignty.	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Introduction	  Responsible	   management,	   and	   corporate	   responsibility	   are	   both	   normative,	   and	  empirical	   issues.	   The	   normative	   approach	   assesses	   the	   deontology	   of	   corporate	  responsibility,	  with	  the	  three	  historically	   important	  orientations:	   liberal,	  welfarist,	  and	  technocratic.	   The	   liberal	   approach	   assumes	   that	   the	   main	   responsibility	   of	   the	  corporation	   is	   to	   assure	   predictable	   return	   on	   the	   capital	   invested,	   without	   any	  particular	   social	   responsibility	   concurring	   with	   that	   basic	   mission.	   The	   welfarist	  standpoint	   sees	   the	   corporation	   as	   the	   guarantor	   of	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   jobs,	   and	   its	  social	   responsibility	  refers	  mostly	   to	  social	  stability	  connected	  with	   the	  very	  existence	  (and	   the	   exact	   geographical	   location!)	   of	   said	   jobs,	   with	   a	   possible	   help	   to	   the	   less	  fortunate	   members	   of	   society.	   The	   concept	   of	   Corporate	   Social	   Responsibility,	   which	  mostly	  takes	  the	  actual	  form	  of	  variously	  orchestrated	  charity,	  seems	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  that	  welfarist	   view.	   Finally,	   the	   technocratic	   approach	   to	   the	   corporation	   accounts	   for	   the	  fact	   that	   business	   structures	   are	   tightly	   interconnected	   with	   infrastructural	   facilities,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  are	  vital	  for	  the	  security	  and	  stability	  of	  modern	  societies.	  The	  managerial	  concept	   of	   operational	   risk,	   born	   in	   the	   world	   of	   banking,	   and	   having	   successfully	  migrated	   into	   the	  broad	  universe	  of	   business	  organization,	   seems	   to	   reflect	   the	   actual	  measure	  of	  that	  technocratic	  grasp	  of	  corporate	  responsibility.	  	  The	   empirical	   insight	   focuses	   on	   the	   actual	   patterns	   of	   corporate	   responsibility,	   and	  their	  evolution	  over	  time.	  A	  significant	  facet	  of	  that	  empirical	  view	  is	  the	  question	  about	  the	  possible	  future	  changes	  in	  the	  patterns	  of	  responsible	  management.	  One	  could	  ask,	  for	   example,	   whether	   we	   live	   in	   a	   de	   facto	   corporate	   social	   order,	   namely	   whether	  corporations	  rule	  the	  today’s	  world,	  or	  if	  they	  will	  possibly	  rule	  the	  world	  of	  tomorrow.	  From	   another	   perspective,	   one	   could	   ask	   whether	   opportunist,	   socially	   irresponsible	  strategies	  of	  corporations	  can	  lead	  to	  durable,	  social	  change,	  with	  a	  weakening	  of	  public	  sovereignty,	  and	  democracy.	  The	  answer	  to	  such	  broad	  questions	  far	  exceeds	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  research	  paper	  like	  this	  one.	  Yet,	  a	  partial	  answer	  focused	  upon	  a	  particular	  field	  of	  social	  life	  is	  possible.	  If	  you	  want	  to	  see	  the	  possible	  changes,	  follow	  the	  critics,	  namely	  the	  critics	  of	  corporate	  governance	  and	  corporations	   in	  general.	  The	   investor-­‐state	  dispute	   settlement	   (ISDS),	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which	  we	  define	  as	  the	  institution	  of	  international	  arbitration	  between	  private	  investors	  and	   their	   host	   states,	   treated	   as	   equals,	   is	   one	   of	   the	  main	   concerns	   from	   the	   part	   of	  various	   anti-­‐corporatist	   movements.	   That	   general	   concern,	   expressed	   abundantly	   in	  mass	   media,	   finds	   its	   reflection	   in	   scientific,	   mostly	   legal	   research	   too	   (e.g.	   Guzman	  1997-­‐19981;	   Coe	   20062;	   Burke-­‐White	   20083;	   van	   Aaken	   20084).	   The	   main	   lines	   of	  criticism	   are:	   lack	   of	   transparency,	   doubtful	   impartiality	   of	   arbiters,	   systematic	  enforcement	  of	  corporate	  claims	  against	  legitimate	  governments,	  and	  a	  clear	  asymmetry	  at	   the	  detriment	   of	   developing	   countries.	   In	  Europe,	   that	   issue	   is	   currently	   associated	  with	   a	   significant,	   institutional	   change	   to	   come,	   namely	   the	   Transatlantic	   Trade	   and	  Investment	  Partnership,	  or	  TTIP.	  In	  Europe,	  the	  TTIP	  is	  likely	  to	  bring	  the	  most	  dramatic	  liberalization	   of	   trade	   and	   investment	   flows	   since	   the	   creation	   of	   European	   Union.	   It	  brings	  a	  growing	  concern	  about	  the	  possible	  imbalance	  in	  economic	  power	  between	  the	  American	  corporations,	  and	  the	  European	  governments.	  The	  TTIP	  is	  likely	  to	  adopt	  the	  already	   classical	   pattern	   of	   protection	   for	   investors,	   with	   international	   arbitration	  among	  the	  main	  procedural	  rights.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  very	  institution	  of	  investor-­‐state	  dispute	  settlement,	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  international	  treaties,	  is	  not	  quite	  new.	  First,	  let’s	  trace	  the	  broad	  context.	  Since	  the	  1960s,	  and	  maybe	  even	   earlier,	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   has	   been	   a	   major	   factor	   of	   economic	  development.	   Governments	   have	   developed	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   institutional	   tools	   to	  attract	   foreign	   investors.	   “Institutional”	   means	   that	   besides	   incidental	   actions	   (e.g.	  occasional	  privatisation),	  some	  more	  durable	  patterns	  of	  public	  policies	  (e.g.	  legal	  rules)	  have	   emerged.	   International	   treaties	   are	   among	   the	   most	   salient	   examples	   of	  institutional	   changes	   directed	   specifically	   on	   attracting	   foreign	   investors.	   The	   typical,	  legal	   construct	   that	   governments	   use	   consists	   of	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  (BIT),	  which,	  in	  turn,	  refer	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  contained	  in	  multilateral	  treaties.	   In	   order	   to	   encourage	   foreign	   investors,	   governments	   give	   them	   legal	  guarantees,	   or	   rights,	   both	   substantive	   and	   procedural.	   The	   Convention	   on	   the	  Settlement	   of	   Investment	   Disputes	   between	   States	   and	   Nationals	   of	   Other	   States	   (the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Guzman, A.T., 1998, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 38, 1997-1998, pp. 639 - 688 
2 Coe, Jack J. Jr, 2006, Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes – Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA 
Leadership, Kansas Law Review, vol. 54, pp. 1339 - 1385 
3 Burke-White, William W., The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 
University of Pennsylvania, Research Paper no. 08-01, also available at the Social Science Research Network: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088837 
4 van Aaken, A., 2008, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International Investment Protection, University of St. 
Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 2008-1 
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ICSID	  Convention	  or	  the	  Convention),	  dating	  back	  to	  1966,	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  institutional	  milestone	   for	   ISDS.	   Around	   that	   date,	   and	   after,	   both	   bilateral,	   and	   multilateral	  commercial	   treaties	   used	   to	   encompass	   a	   typical	   set	   of	   rights	   that	   governments	  guarantee	   to	   foreign,	   private	   investors.	   Those	   rights	   are	   both	   substantive,	   and	  procedural.	  Their	  general	  principle	   is	   that	  of	  a	   treatment	  not	   less	   favourable,	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	  private	   investor,	   than	   the	   treatment	  available	  under	   international	  law	  (Guzman	  1998;	  Franck	  2008).	  The	  procedural	  rights	  cover	  the	  possibility	  of	  having	  recourse	  to	  international	  arbitration	  between	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  private	  investor,	  should	  all	  the	  national	  legal	  means	  have	  been	  exhausted.	  A	  good	  example	  is	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Georgia	  /	  Greece	  Bilateral	  Investment	  Treaty:	  	  	  
“ARTICLE	  9	  
Settlement	  of	  Disputes	  between	  an	  Investor	  and	  a	  Contracting	  Party	  
1.	  Disputes	  between	  an	  investor	  of	  a	  Contracting	  Party	  and	  the	  other	  
Contracting	   Party	   concerning	   an	   obligation	   of	   the	   latter	   under	   this	  
Agreement,	   in	   relation	   to	   an	   investment	   of	   the	   former,	   shall,	   if	  
possible,	  be	  settled	  by	  the	  disputing	  parties	  in	  an	  amicable	  way.	  
2.	  If	  such	  disputes	  cannot	  be	  settled	  within	  six	  months	  from	  the	  date	  
either	   party	   requested	   amicable	   settlement,	   the	   investor	   concerned	  
may	   submit	   the	   dispute	   either	   to	   the	   competent	   courts	   of	   the	  
Contracting	  Party	   in	   the	   territory	  of	  which	   the	   investment	  has	  been	  
made	  or	  to	  international	  arbitration.	  
Each	   Contracting	   Party	   hereby	   consents	   to	   the	   submission	   of	   such	  
dispute	  to	  international	  arbitration.	  
3.	   Where	   the	   dispute	   is	   referred	   to	   international	   arbitration	   the	  
Investor	  concerned	  may	  submit	  the	  dispute	  either	  to:	  
a)	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes,	  
established	   under	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Settlement	   of	   Investment	  
Disputes	   between	   States	   and	   Nationals	   of	   Other	   States,	   opened	   for	  
signature	   at	  Washington	  D.C.	   on	   18	  March	   1965,	   for	   arbitration	   or	  
c[o]nciliation,	  or	  
b)	  an	  ad	  hoc	  arbitral	  tribunal	  to	  be	  established	  under	  the	  arbitration	  
rules	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  International	  Trade	  Law	  
(U.N.C.I.T.R.A.L.).	  
4.	   The	  arbitral	   tribunal	   shall	   decide	   the	   dispute	   in	   accordance	  with	  
the	   provisions	   of	   this	   Agreement	   and	   the	   applicable	   rules	   and	  
principles	   of	   international	   law.	   The	   awards	   of	   arbitration	   shall	   be	  
final	   and	   binding	   on	   both	   parties	   to	   the	   dispute.	   Each	   Contracting	  
Party	  shall	  carry	  out	  without	  delay	  any	  such	  award	  and	  such	  award	  
shall	  be	  enforced	  in	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  law.	  
5.	  During	  arbitration	  proceedings	  or	   the	   enforcement	  of	   the	  award,	  
the	   Contracting	   Party	   involved	   in	   the	   dispute	   shall	   not	   raise	   the	  
objection	   that	   the	   investor	   of	   the	   other	   Contracting	   Party	   has	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received	  compensation	  under	  an	  Insurance	  contract	   in	  respect	  of	  all	  
or	  part	  of	  the	  damage.”	  	  	  	  	  If	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  is	  growing	  in	  importance,	  like	  the	  one	  presently	  discussed,	  there	  has	  to	  be	  some	  kind	  of	  logic	  to	  that.	  In	  other	  words,	  just	  saying	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  ISDS	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy,	  and	  thus	  implicitly	  treating	  the	  phenomenon	  at	  hand	  as	  random,	  or	   conspiracy-­‐based,	   seems	   irrational.	   There	   probably	   is	   an	   underlying	   social	   change,	  and	   the	  presently	  growing	  wave	  of	   ISDS	   is	  very	  much	   likely	   to	  be	  a	   symptom	  of	  what	  legal	  scholars	  call	  “system	  building”	  (Nottage	  20065;	  Bjorklund	  20096;	  Schill	  20117).	  One	  should	  keep	   in	  mind	  that	   ISDS	   is	  closely	   linked	  to	   two,	  quite	  young	  social	  phenomena.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   since	   the	   1950s,	  we	   have	   been	  witnessing	   a	   steady	   growth	   of	   both	  foreign	   direct	   investment,	   and	   financial	   markets	   as	   a	   whole.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  combination	  of	  post-­‐colonial,	  and	  post-­‐communist	  geopolitical	  changes	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  countries,	  mostly	  developing	  ones,	  with	  some	  of	  them	  having	  already	  passed,	   or	   just	   passing	   into	   the	   category	   of	   emerging	   markets.	   Those	   new	   countries	  became	   the	   hosts	   of	   significant	   foreign	   investment,	   which	   was	   accompanied	   by	   the	  corresponding,	   both	   qualitative,	   and	   quantitative	   development	   of	   financial	  markets.	   A	  completely	   new	   economic	   structure	   had	   thus	   emerged,	   and	   it	   keeps	   on	   calling	   for	  relevant	   legal	   regulations.	   In	   the	   overall	   dynamics	   of	   BIT	   signed,	   two	   waves	   are	   to	  notice:	  the	  big,	  post-­‐colonial	  one	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  followed	  by	  a	  second,	  slightly	  smaller,	  post-­‐communist	  one	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s.	  Both	  waves	  had	  a	  common	  denominator:	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  newly	  emerged	  governments	  was	  significantly	  broader	  than	   their	   actual	   economic	   power.	   What	   those	   governments	   desperately	   needed	   was	  capital,	  to	  ground	  their	  political	  power.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  both	  waves	  corresponded	  to	  a	   significant	   change	   in	   the	   global	   economic	   landscape.	   The	   1970s	   brought	   both	   a	  liberalization	   of	   financial	   markets,	   and	   a	   first,	   significant	   economic	   shock	   after	   the	  Second	   World	   War,	   namely	   the	   oil	   crisis.	   Both	   factors	   contributed	   to	   awaken	   the	  investor’s	   interest	   in	   the	   assets	   located	   in	   newly	   emerging,	   developing	   countries.	  Another	   financial	   crisis,	   and	   a	   resulting	   a	   reshuffling	   of	   financial	  markets	  marked	   the	  early	   1990s.	   Once	  more,	   new	   directions	   of	   foreign	   investment,	   namely	   the	   emerging,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nottage, L., 2006, The Procedural Lex Mercatoria: The Past, Present and Future of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper no. 06/51, also available at the Social Science Research Network: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=838028  
6 Bjokrlund, A., 2009, The Emerging Civilzation of Investment Arbitration, Penn State Law Review, vol. 113:4, pp. 1269 – 
1300. 
7 Schill, Stephan W., 2011, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, German Law Journal, Vol. 12 
No. 05, pp. 1083 - 1110 
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post-­‐communist	  countries,	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  private	  capital.	  Thus,	  each	  wave	  of	  new	   BIT	   signed	   corresponded	   to	   a	   wave	   of	   structural	   change	   in	   the	   global,	   capital	  market.	   The	   factor	   of	   time	   is	   capital	   here.	   Most	   legal	   institutions	   that	   make	   the	  foundations	  of	   the	  current	   social	  order	  are	  hundreds	  of	  years	  old,	  with	   some	  of	   them,	  like	   the	   basic	   rules	   of	   civil	   law,	   tapping	   their	   intellectual	   content	   out	   of	   the	   Ancient	  Rome’s	   tradition.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   that	   legal	   tradition,	   the	   completely	   new	   challenges	   of	  international	  commercial	  law	  are	  barely	  a	  blink.	  Legal	  rules	  take	  time	  to	  adapt.	  	  Susan	  D.	  Franck,	  in	  two	  consecutive	  papers	  (Franck	  20088,	  20099)	  brings	  an	  interesting,	  quantitative	  insight	  into	  the	  observable	  patterns	  in	  both	  the	  initiation	  of	  investor-­‐state	  disputes,	  and	  their	  resolution.	  A	  majority	  of	  claims	  come	  from	  the	  U.S.	  nationals,	  and,	  in	  general,	   from	   those	   of	   the	   developed	   countries.	   Conversely,	   respondent	   governments	  are	   those	   of	   developing	   countries,	   yet	   they	   are	   the	   relatively	   wealthier	   ones,	   not	   the	  strictly	   spoken	   Low	   Income	   countries.	   Among	   the	   several	   hundreds	   of	   bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  in	  force,	  only	  a	  few	  dozens	  seem	  to	  give	  systematic	  rise	  to	  investor-­‐state	   disputes,	   the	  NAFTA	   treaty,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  U.S.	   –	   Argentina	   bilateral	   one,	   largely	  leading.	  Despite	  the	  critics	  against	  the	  impartiality	  of	  arbiters	  appointed	  by	  international	  organizations,	   institutionalized	   arbitration,	   and	   more	   specifically	   that	   under	   the	  auspices	  of	  ICSID	  (International	  Centre	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes)	  seems	  to	  prevail	   substantially	   over	   the	  ad	  hoc	   arbitration	   tribunals.	   Less	   than	   40%	   of	   disputes	  seem	   to	   end	   up	   with	   the	   investor	   winning,	   and	   almost	   60%	   of	   cases	   lead	   to	   a	   legal	  victory	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government	  sued.	  The	  settled	  cases	  (i.e.	  without	  award	  for	  any	  of	  the	  parties,	  and	  without	  de	  facto	  legal	  victory	  for	  any	  of	  them)	  are	  rather	  an	  exception.	  Investors	   seem	   to	   be	   much	   more	   successful	   in	   the	   jurisdictional	   phase,	   whilst	  governments	  tend	  to	  win	  more	  frequently	   in	  the	  merits’	  phase.	   In	  the	  damages’	  phase,	  results	   are	   mixed.	   As	   a	   rule,	   the	   damages	   actually	   awarded	   to	   private	   investors	   are	  several	   times	   lower	   than	   their	   claims,	   on	   average	   2	   cents	   awarded	   on	   every	   dollar	  claimed.	   A	   significant	   majority	   of	   ISDS	   claims	   is	   related	   to	   businesses	   in	   the	   energy	  sector,	  and	  that	  of	  infrastructural	  services	  (e.g.	  water	  supply).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Franck, Susan D., 2008, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, North Carolina Law Review, vol. 
86, pp. 1 - 86 
9 Franck, Susan D., 2009, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, Harvard International Law Journal, 
Vol. 50, pp. 435 - 489 
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Both	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  Susan	  D.Franck’s	  research,	  and	  the	  recent	  data	  published	  by	  UNCTAD	  (201310)	  suggest	  a	  rapidly	  growing	  number	  of	  investor-­‐state	  disputes.	  In	  2012,	  58	   new	   treaty-­‐based	   disputes	   were	   initiated,	   the	   highest	   number	   ever.	   In	   order	   to	  assess,	  whether	  that	  recent	  surge	  in	  ISDS	  predicts	  the	  advent	  of	  “corporate	  world”,	  one	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  a	  basic	  rule	  of	  research:	  as	  ISDS	  is	  treaty-­‐based,	  one	  should	  study	  both	   ISDS	  as	   such,	  and	   the	   treaties	   that	   ISDS	   is	  based	  on.	   International	   cooperation	   in	  the	  broad	  sense	   is	  regulated	  by	  some	  50	  000	  treaties,	  mostly	  bilateral,	  registered	  with	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Only	  about	  50%	  of	   them	  have	  any	  provisions	   for	   the	  resolution	  of	  disputes.	   Strong	   empirical	   evidence	   allows	   concluding	   that	   external	   delegation	   (i.e.	  delegation	   of	   dispute	   resolution	   to	   external	   legal	   bodies,	   like	   arbitration	   tribunals)	   is	  used,	  as	  a	  legal	  device,	  whenever	  the	  signatory	  governments	  face	  important	  uncertainty.	  Said	   uncertainty	   regards	   both	   the	   state	   of	   the	  world	   in	   general,	   and	   the	  way	   that	   the	  given	   field	   of	   international	   cooperation	   will	   develop	   (Koremenos	   et	   al.	   2001 11 ;	  Koremenos,	  Snidal	  200312;	  Koremenos	  200713).	  	  The	   present	   paper	   attempts	   to	   develop	   a	   theoretical	   framework,	   to	   demonstrate	   that	  what	  some	  call	   “an	  eruption”	  of	   ISDS	  combines	   long-­‐term	  trends	  of	   legal	  changes	  with	  the	   somehow	   unique,	   and	   shorter	   in	   range	   outcomes	   of	   the	   post-­‐colonial,	   and	   post-­‐communist	   geopolitical	   changes.	   That	   theoretical	   development	   is	   astride	   economic	  sciences,	  law,	  and	  politics.	  
The	  theoretical	  perspective	  	  We	   start	   with	   a	   basic	   assumption	   that	   any	   hierarchical,	   social	   structure	   –	   states	   and	  corporations	   included	   -­‐	   is	  able	   to	  sustain	   itself	  over	   long	  periods	  of	   time	   if	   it	  has	  both	  legitimation,	   and	   economic	   power.	   Legitimation	   is	   defined	   qualitatively,	   and	  quantitatively.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  a	  set	  of	  basic	  rights,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  actions	  to	  which	  the	  government	   is	  entitled.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  qualitative	  scope	  of	   legitimation	  can	  be	  translated	   into	  some	  kind	  of	  quantitative	   index.	  Legitimation	   is	  grounded	  both	   in	  past	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 2013, Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS), Issues Note no.1, May 2013 
11 Koremenos, B., Lipson, Ch., Snidal, D., 2001, The Rational Design of International Institutions, International Organization, 
vol.  55, pp. 761– 799. 
12 Koremenos, B., Snidal, D., 2003, Moving Forward, One Step at a Time, International Organization, vol. 57, pp. 431– 444. 
13 Koremenos, B., 2007, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs 
Explaining?, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 36, January 2007, pp. 189 - 212 
 
	   8	  
communicative,	   political	   action	   (Habermas	   197514,	   197915,	   199616),	   and	   the	   actual,	  normative	   quality	   of	   the	   social	   order	   in	   place	   (Rawls	   199917).	   Economic	   power	   is	  grounded	   in	   the	   actual	   control	   over	   flows	   and	   balances	   of	   capital,	   both	   financial	   and	  physical.	   That	   definition	   of	   economic	   power	   is	  mostly	   based	   upon	   the	   agency	   theory,	  known	   from	   the	   new	   institutional	   school	   in	   economics,	   and	   created	   essentially	   to	  explain	  the	  behaviour	  of	  corporations	  (see:	  Berle,	  Means	  193218;	  Wilson	  196819;	  Berhold	  197120;	  197321;	  Jensen,	  Meckling	  197622;	  Fama,	  Jensen	  198323).	  Of	  course,	  defining	  political	  power	  with	  reference	  to	  economic	  power	  is	  also	  very	  much	  related	  to	  the	  works	  of	  Karl	  Marx.	  In	  that	  Marxist,	  social	  mechanism	  of	  capital	  transfer,	  the	   powers	   of	   public	   agents	   have	   the	   social	   role	   of	   quasi-­‐property	   rights.	   The	  constructive	  possession	  of	  capital	  by	  public	  agents	  relies	  on	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  the	  sovereignty	   of	   the	   state.	   It	   is	   probably	   the	   strongest	   possible	   case	   of	   constructive	  possession.	   Besides	   the	   powers	   expressly	   written	   in	   the	   law,	   there	   is	   a	   whole	   set	   of	  discretional	  powers.	  The	  latter	  emerge	  whenever	  the	  law	  allows	  decisional	  freedom	  to	  public	   agents,	   either	   on	   purpose,	   or	   by	   unwanted	   collision	   of	   legal	   rules.	   Those	  discretional	  powers	  are	  directly	  proportional	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  capital	  that	  public	  agents	  have	   possession	   of	   within	   their	   discretional	   freedom.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   to	   assume	   that	   the	  distribution	   of	   discretional	   public	   powers	   across	   the	   social	   system	   significantly	  influences	  the	  set	  of	  property	  rights.	  	  For	  any	  social	  agent,	  governments	  included,	  legitimacy	  and	  economic	  power	  can	  remain	  in	   three	   possible	   relations	   to	   each	   other.	   The	   hypothetical,	   perfect	   state	   of	   nature	   is	  equilibrium,	  in	  which	  economic	  power	  is	  just	  what	  the	  social	  agent	  needs	  to	  fulfil	  their	  legitimate	  rights	  and	  prerogatives,	  and,	  correspondingly,	   the	  actual	   legitimation	   is	   just	  what	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   exploit	   the	   economic	   power	   at	   hand.	   With	   a	   hint	   of	  simplification,	  real	  political	  power	   is	   to	   find	   in	  that	  equilibrium	  zone,	  or	  at	   least	   in	  the	  zone	  of	  legitimation	  and	  economic	  power	  overlapping	  each	  other.	  Legitimation	  changes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Habermas, J., 1975, Legitimation Crisis, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston, 1975 
15 Habermas, J., 1979, Communication and the Evolution of Society, translated by T.McCarthy, Boston 1979 
16 Habermas, J., 1996, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, translated by William Rehg, Second Printing  
17 Rawls, J., 1999, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
18 Berle, A., A., Means, G.,C., 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co, 1932 
19 Wilson, R., 1968, On the Theory of Syndicates, Econometrica, vol. 36 (January), pp. 119-132 
20 Berhold, M., 1971, A Theory of Linear Profit Sharing Incentives, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LXXXV (August), pp. 
460-482 
21 Ross, S., A., 1973, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problems, American Economic Review, vol. LXII (May), 
pp. 134-139 
22 Jensen, M.,C., Meckling, W.,H., 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, ( October ), vo. 3, no. 4, pp. 305 - 360 
23 Fama, E.,F., Jensen, M.,C., 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI, June 
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slowly,	   at	   the	   pace	   of	   legal	   change,	   which	   can	   take	   hundreds	   of	   years	   in	   some	   cases,	  decades	  at	  best.	  Conversely,	  economic	  power	  changes	  quickly,	  sometimes	  within	  weeks.	  Governments	   can	   acquire	   or	   lose	   economic	   power	   significantly	   faster	   than	   they	   can	  change	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  legitimacy,	  as	  the	  former	  is	  very	  much	  in	  the	  swift	  hands	  of	  the	  executive	  power,	  whilst	   the	   latter	  depends	  mostly	  on	   the	  much	  steadier	  actions	  of	   the	  legislative	  and	  judiciary	  branches.	  	  If	   we	   attempt	   to	   see	   political	   power	   in	   quantitative	   terms,	   we	   can	   speak	   of	   a	   certain	  amount	   of	   it,	   possible	   to	   achieve	   through	   various	   combinations	   of	   legitimation,	   and	  economic	  power.	  Thus,	  some	  kind	  of	  indifference	  curve	  may	  be	  traced,	  showing	  various	  possible	   structures	   of	   a	   given	   amount	   of	   political	   power,	   regarding	   its	   footing	   in	  legitimation,	  and	  in	  the	  control	  of	  capital.	  When	  the	  mutual	  proportions	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  economic	  power,	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  legitimation	  slide	  out	  of	  a	  reasonably	  defined	  neighbourhood	  of	  equilibrium,	  two	  types	  of	   disequilibria	   can	   arise.	   Firstly,	   there	   can	   be	   economic	   power	  without	   or	  with	   very	  little	  legitimation.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  given	  social	  entity	  controls	  an	  amount	  of	  capital,	  and	  has	  an	  amount	  of	  economic	  power	  significantly	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  legitimation.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Ali	  Baba’s	  treasure.	  It	  gives	  significant,	  discretional	  power,	  but	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  destabilize	   the	   whole	   social	   structure.	   Secondly,	   there	   can	   be	   legitimation	   combined	  with	   disproportionately	   weak	   economic	   power.	   The	   given	   social	   agent	   is	   legitimately	  allowed	  to	  do	  things	  that	  he	  has	  no	  sufficient	  capital	  to	  perform.	  If	  the	  latter	  case	  is	  that	  of	   the	   government,	   there	   is	   an	   objectively	   observable	   need	   to	   acquire	  more	   capital	   in	  order	  to	  assure	  an	  economic	  power,	  which	  would	  be	  at	  least	  in	  correspondence	  with	  the	  scope	  of	  legitimation,	  possibly	  even	  greater.	  	  A	  government	  with	  a	  legitimation	  exceeding	  its	  real	  economic	  power	  can	  acquire	  capital	  through	   three	   possible	   ways.	   It	   can	   forcefully	   take	   the	   possession	   of	   some	   assets,	   by	  sovereign	   decision,	   in	   the	   limits	   allowed	   by	   legitimation,	   of	   course.	   Let’s	   call	   it	  “sovereign	  acquisition”.	  The	  imposition	  of	  taxes	  is	  a	  classical	  example	  of	  that	  way,	  whilst	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  property	  rights	  is	  a	  more	  drastic	  one.	  The	  second	  possible	  path	  is	  public	  borrowing,	  whilst	  privatisation	  of	  assets	  is	  the	  third	  one.	  	  Those	   three	   forms	   of	   increasing	   economic	   power	   confer	   to	   the	   government	   economic	  power	  of	  uneven	  quality,	  so	  to	  say.	  They	  have	  their	  mutual	  dynamics,	   too.	  The	  greater	  the	  gap	  between	  legitimation,	  and	  economic	  power,	  and,	  consequently,	  the	  lesser	  is	  the	  government’s	  real	  political	  power,	  the	  lesser	  is	  the	  capacity	  for	  sovereign	  acquisition.	  If	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we	  don’t	   have	  money	   to	  pay	   the	  wages	  of	   qualified	   clerks,	  we	   cannot	  hope	   to	   impose	  really	  collectable	  taxes.	  The	  lesser	  the	  capacity	  for	  sovereign	  acquisition,	  the	  lesser	  the	  capacity	  for	  public	  borrowing:	  money	  is	  lent	  mostly	  to	  those,	  who	  can	  pay	  it	  back	  with	  interest,	  hence	  who	  can	  efficiently	  impose	  and	  collect	  taxes.	  Those,	  whose	  ability	  to	  do	  so	  is	  doubtful,	  have	  significantly	  harder	  access	  to	  debt.	  If	  the	  gap	  between	  legitimation,	  and	   economic	   power	   is	   really	   wide,	   sovereign	   acquisition	   and	   public	   borrowings	   are	  quite	  limited	  ways	  to	  reduce	  it.	  Privatisation	  is	  frequently	  the	  name	  of	  the	  game	  in	  such	  situations.	  	  Sovereign	   acquisition	   may	   increase	   the	   scope	   of	   legitimation,	   the	   same	   as	   public	  borrowing.	   With	   increasing	   tax	   revenues,	   and	   a	   good	   borrowing	   capacity,	   the	  government	   may	   claim	   some	   fields	   of	   social	   cooperation,	   for	   example	   through	  systematic	  public	  procurement,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  sector	  of	  healthcare.	  Conversely,	  privatisation	   is	   likely	   to	   severe	   some	   fields	   of	   social	   action	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  government’s	   legitimation24.	   Thus,	   if	  we	   have	   a	   government	   in	   real	   need	   of	   economic	  power	  with	  quite	  a	  broad	   legitimation,	  yet	  poor	   in	  capital,	  a	  political	   time	  bomb	  starts	  ticking.	   Privatisation	   is	   likely	   to	   become	  massive,	   and	   irrational	   in	   terms	   of	   price,	   at	  which	  assets	  are	  transferred	  to	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  price	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  broadly,	  not	  only	  as	  the	  lump	  sum	  of	  money	  paid	  by	  the	  private	  acquirer,	  but	  as	  the	  total	  balance	  of	   mutual	   obligations	   on	   the	   part	   of,	   respectively,	   the	   government,	   and	   the	   private	  investor.	  Politically	  forced,	  hasty	  privatisation	  leads	  to	  bad	  deals,	  which	  ultimately	  will	  bring	  a	  pressure	  on	  both	  the	  scope	  of	  legitimation,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  economic	  power	  held	  by	  the	  government.	  Finally,	  the	  government	  comes	  to	  a	  point,	  where	  further	  loss	  of	  legitimation,	   inclusive	   of	   further	   privatisation,	   can	   lead	   it	   not	   to	   being	   a	   government	  anymore,	  and	  possibly	  to	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  state	  itself	  (e.g.	  Sudan).	  At	  this	  point,	  two	  alternative	  scenarios	  arise:	  entrenchment	  or	  reclaiming.	  The	  government	  can	   lock	  itself	   in	   that	   quite	   unimpressive	   ivory	   tower	   of	   residual	   sovereignty,	   and	   accept	   the	  position	   of	   barely	   a	   player	   among	   others.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   government	   may	  attempt	  to	  reclaim	  some	  of	  the	  previously	  privatized	  assets.	  Reclaiming	  in	  this	  case	  is	  a	  broad	   concept,	   covering	   both	   the	   property	   rights	   strictly	   spoken,	   and	   the	   obligatory	  rights	   connected	   to	   some	   assets.	   The	   strategy	   of	   entrenchment	   is	   that	   of	   a	   weak	  government,	  which	  actually	  cannot	  fully	  enforce	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  hence	  cannot	  properly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The course of social changes in Central and Eastern Europe is a good example of the latter mechanism. Massive 
privatization at the beginning of the 1990s seems to have permanently removed most fields of doing business from the scope 
of legitimation of the previously omnipresent governments. 
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protect	   property	   rights.	   Some	   investors	   may	   be	   expropriated,	   or	   otherwise	  disadvantaged	   at	   the	   benefit	   of	   some	   others,	   the	   tougher,	   smarter,	   and	   ones	   that	   are	  more	   influential.	   Yet,	   the	   government	   in	   place,	   as	   weak	   as	   it	   is,	   provides	   at	   least	   the	  simulacrum	   of	   legality	   to	   those	   unfair	   private	   deals.	   Should	   the	   reclaiming	   strategy	  dominate	  in	  public	  policy,	  the	  government	  is	  bound	  to	  take	  steps	  that	  put	  a	  clear	  brake	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  profits	  possible	  to	  make	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  previously	  privatized	  assets.	  Anyway,	  some	  private	  investors	  are	  hurt,	  and	  some	  arise.	  	  	  	  	  	  That	  entire	  theoretical	  construct,	  as	  presented	  above,	  allows	  hypothesizing	  that	  both	  the	  recent	   surge	   in	   the	   number	   of	   investor-­‐state	   disputes,	   and	   the	   specific	   quantitative	  pattern	   of	   these	   disputes	   are	   the	   delayed	   outcome	   of	   forceful,	   frequently	   irrationally	  quick	  privatisation,	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  support	  the	  frail	  political	  position	  of	  newly	  emerging,	   post-­‐colonial,	   and	   post-­‐communist	   governments	   with	   additional	   capital.	  Investor-­‐state	   disputes	   seem	   to	   result	   mostly	   from	   either	   local	   struggles	   for	   power	  between	   private	   investors,	   poorly	   legitimized	   by	   local	   governments,	   or	   from	   active	  attempts,	   from	   the	   part	   of	   said	   local	   governments	   to	   regain	   the	   right	   to	   dispose	   of	   at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  previously	  privatized	  assets.	  	  
Illustrative	  case	  studies	  	  In	   the	   realm	  of	   investor-­‐state	  disputes,	   the	   cases	   against	  Argentina	   as	   respondent	   are	  almost	  a	  separate	  category.	  Both	   the	  sheer	  number	  of	  cases	  (more	   than	  40),	  and	   their	  saliently	  repetitive	  characteristics	  make	   it	  a	   textbook-­‐like	  example.	   In	   the	  early	  1990s,	  the	   government	   of	   Argentina	   conducted	   an	   extensive	   privatisation	   in	  many	   sectors	   of	  the	   economy,	   energy	   and	   infrastructure	   included.	   The	   admission	   of	   foreign	   investors,	  and	  extensive	  foreign	  indebtedness	  of	  the	  government	  allowed	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  perform	  a	  civilizational	   leap	  forward.	  The	  so-­‐called	  Convertibility	  Plan	  of	  1991	  pegged	  the	   Argentinian	   peso	   to	   the	  U.S.	   dollar,	  which,	   combined	  with	   privatization,	   created	   a	  unique	   opportunity	   for	   foreign	   investors:	   assets	   were	   much	   cheaper	   than	   in	   the	  developed	  countries,	  but	  the	  dollarized	  internal	  market	  almost	  guaranteed	  high	  returns	  on	   investment	   (see	   for	   example:	   Sturzenegger,	   Zettelmeyer	   200625).	   Some	   ten	   years	  later,	   about	   the	  year	  2000,	   a	   combination	  of	   external	   shocks	  and	  bad	  economic	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Sturzenegger, F., Zettelmeyer, J., 2006, Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises, The MIT Press Cambridge, 
Massachusetts London, England, pp. 165 - 202 
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triggered	   a	   deep	   economic	   crisis,	   and	   great	   political	   instability.	   As	   addressing	   those	  exceptional	   circumstances,	   the	   government	   in	   place	   took	   several	   steps	   aiming	  both	   at	  giving	  a	  new	  kick	  to	  the	  sluggish	  economic	  growth,	  and	  at	  calming	  social	  unrest.	  One	  of	  the	  steps	  consisted	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  “pesification”	  of	  the	  economy	  (i.e.	  in	  backing	  off	  from	  the	   parity	   to	  U.S.	   dollar),	   and	   in	   freezing,	   temporarily,	   the	   prices	   of	   basic	   goods.	   Only	  then,	  the	  authorities	  realized	  how	  extensive	  were	  the	  rights	  that	  their	  predecessors	  had	  granted	  to	  foreign	  investors,	  and	  how	  brutal	  a	  reduction	  of	  those	  rights	  was	  necessary	  to	  implement	  the	  strategy	  designed	  for	  coping	  with	  the	  economic	  crisis.	  Some	  experts	  state	  firmly	   that	   the	   steps	   taken	   were	   justified	   by	   exceptional	   circumstances,	   and	   stayed	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  reasonably	  understood,	  public	  sovereignty	  (see	  for	  example:	  Burke-­‐White	  200826).	  Yet,	  an	  avalanche	  of	  disputes	  ensued,	  some	  of	  them	  landing	  at	  the	  level	  of	  international	  arbitration.	  Arbitration	  tribunals,	  whilst	  keeping	  quite	  a	  distanced	  position	  as	   for	   the	   specific	   claims	   for	   damages	   from	   the	   part	   of	   particular	   claimants,	   kept	   a	  noticeably	   uniform	   line	   of	   thinking	   as	   for	   the	   conflict	   between	   private	   rights	   of	   the	  investors,	  and	  public	  sovereignty.	  That	  line	  of	  thinking	  resulted	  generally	  in	  adjudicating	  merits	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   claimants.	   One,	   illustrative	   case	   is	   that	   of	   Sempra	   Energy	  
International	   (Claimant)	   vs	   Argentine	   Republic	   (Respondent),	   brought	   before	   the	  International	   Centre	   for	   Settlement	   of	   Investment	   Disputes27.	   The	   privatisation	   of	   the	  gas	   transportation	   and	   distribution	   facilities	   that	   took	   place	   in	   Argentina	   since	   1989	  through	   1992,	   in	   some	   cases	   extending	   through	   1996,	  went	   as	   far	   as	   guaranteeing	   to	  foreign	  investors	  non-­‐decreasing,	  real	  selling	  prices	  to	  their	  customers.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  arbitration,	   the	   temporal	   horizon	   of	   these	   guarantees	   came	   into	   discussion,	   and	   the	  Claimant	  brought	  forth	  a	  very	  strong	  argumentation	  that	  the	  guarantee	  of	  prices	  was,	  in	  fact,	   ever	   lasting	   (!).	   No	   government	   can	   reasonably	   guarantee	   to	   a	   private	   investor,	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  basic	  utility	  supplies,	  an	  ever-­‐lasting	  margin	  of	  profitability.	  It	  is	  a	   breach	   to	   the	   basic	   logic	   of	  market	   economy.	   As	   assessed	   from	   the	   today’s	   point	   of	  view,	   such	   a	   guarantee	   is	   at	   the	   limit	   of	   economic	   sanity,	   thus	   at	   the	   limit	   of	   the	  government’s	   rational	   legitimacy,	   yet	   it	   was	   effectively	   given	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  1990s.	  The	  actual	  revolt	  against	  that	  mechanism	  of	  non-­‐decreasing	  profits	  started	  in	  the	  judiciary	   field	  of	   the	  Argentinian	   state,	  with	   court	   injunctions	   (200028),	   and	   later	   took	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Burke-White, William W., The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 
University of Pennsylvania, Research Paper no. 08-01, also available at the Social Science Research Network: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088837 
27 ICSID Case no. ARB/02/16 
28 Judicial injunction of August 2000 (Resolution 3480/00) 
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the	   form	   of	   policies	   at	   the	   governmental	   level.	   The	   arbitration	   tribunal,	   under	   the	  auspices	  of	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  (ICSID),	  had	  a	  hard	   case	   there.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   economic	   common	   sense	   vigorously	   revolts	  against	  ever-­‐lasting	  profit	  margins,	  as	  contrary	  to	  the	   logic	  of	  competitive	  markets.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  any	  tribunal	  has	  to	  apply	  law	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Both	  general	  regulations,	  and	   individual	   contracts	   in	   this	   case	  strongly	  advocated	   in	   favour	  of	   those	  guaranteed	  prices.	  The	   final	  award	  attempted	  at	  being	  equitable,	  by	  adjudicating	  merits	  mostly	   in	  favour	   of	   the	   Claimant,	   yet	   reducing	   the	   awarded	   damages	   to	   the	   strict	   minimum	  possible.	   Prof	  William	   Burke	   –	  White,	   for	   example	   (Burke-­‐White	   200829)	   expressed	   a	  very	  strong	  view	  that	  this,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  awards	  adjudicated	  by	  arbitration	  tribunals	  under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	   ICSID	   tend	   to	   violate	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   Argentine	  Republic.	   The	   author	   of	   the	   present	   paper	   argues	   that	   the	   breach	   of	   sovereignty	   had	  taken	  place	  many	  years	  earlier,	  as	  those	  incredibly	  unfavourable	  contracts	  were	  signed,	  with	   the	   corresponding	   general	   regulations	   being	   enacted.	   Moreover,	   that	   breach	   to	  sovereignty	  was	  not	  the	  work	  of	  any	  international	  arbiter,	  but	  of	  the	  same	  Argentinian	  government	   that	   conducted	   the	   massive	   privatisation	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   1990s.	  Later	   on,	   successive	   Argentinian	   governments	   have	   been	   trying	   to	   reclaim	   that	   lost	  legitimacy,	   and,	   on	   the	  whole,	   they	   have	   been	   quite	   successful.	   Decisions	   of	   the	   ICSID	  tribunals,	   with	   significant	   merits	   awarded	   to	   various	   private	   claimants,	   and	   actual	  damages	  reduced	  to	  minimum,	  create	  a	  path	  of	  accomplished	   facts,	   through	  which	  the	  Argentinian	  state	  is	  progressively	  reclaiming	  the	  previously	  lost	  assets.	  Argentine	   is	  a	  category	   in	   itself,	  and,	   in	  a	  general	  manner,	   illustrates	  the	  case	  of	  active	  reclaiming,	   from	   the	   part	   of	   the	   government,	   of	   the	   previously	   lost	   sovereignty,	   in	  connection	  with	   inconsiderate	   privatisation.	   Now,	   let’s	   turn	   our	   attention	   somewhere	  else,	  to	  cases	  that	  enter	  into	  the	  “entrenchment”	  type	  of	  behaviour	  from	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government.	   An	   illustrative	   case	   is	   that	   of	   Ioannis	   Kardassopoulos	   and	   Ron	   Fuchs,	   as	  Claimants,	  against	  the	  Republic	  of	  Georgia,	  as	  the	  Respondent30.	  This	  is	  maybe	  an	  even	  more	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  lengths,	  to	  which	  an	  emerging	  government	  can	  go	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  at	  least	  some	  economic	  power.	  In	  1991	  and	  1992,	  the	  newly	  created	  Republic	  of	  Georgia	   struggled	   for	  both	   international	   recognition,	  and	  at	   least	  minimum	   internal	  coherence.	  At	  that	  very	  moment,	  the	  Claimants	  managed	  to	  sign,	  with	  the	  government	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Burke-White, William W., The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 
University of Pennsylvania, Research Paper no. 08-01, also available at the Social Science Research Network: 
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the	   young	   republic,	   an	   incredibly	   advantageous	   contract,	   granting	   them,	   with	   a	   truly	  minuscule	   financial	   involvement	   from	   their	   part,	   the	   actual	   monopoly	   for	   the	  exploitation,	  and	  exportation	  of	  the	  domestic	  resources	  of	  oil,	  and	  natural	  gas.	  From	  the	  today’s	  perspective,	  the	  contract	  was	  something	  of	  a	  miraculous	  deal	  for	  the	  Claimants;	  so	   miraculous	   that	   in	   normal,	   political	   circumstances	   no	   company,	   even	   among	   the	  biggest	   boys	   at	   the	   playground	   (e.g.	   BP	   or	   Shell)	   couldn’t	   dream	   about	   anything	   even	  close	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  that	  contract.	  A	  witness	  statement,	  heard	  during	  the	  arbitration,	  is	  particularly	   illustrative	   for	   the	   circumstances,	   in	   which	   the	   contract	   was	   signed.	   The	  statement	  in	  question	  is	  that	  of	  Mr.	  Nanikashvili,	  a	  Georgian-­‐born	  businessman	  living	  in	  Israel,	  who	  described	   the	   situation	   in	   the	  newly	   independent	  Georgia.	   For	   the	   sake	  of	  keeping	  the	  factual	  strength	  of	  the	  testimony,	  it	  is	  reported	  literally	  here	  below.	  	  
“After	  Soviet	  Union	  split,	  it	  appear	  vacuum	  in	  the	  system	  of	  the	  fuel	  and	  energy,	  because	  
every	  country,	  they	  own	  Transneft,	  they	  own	  oil	  field,	  and	  before	  everything	  was	  
concentrate	  in	  the	  centre:	  export	  in	  the	  centre,	  budget	  from	  the	  centre,	  everything	  from	  the	  
centre.	  And	  suddenly	  there	  is	  no	  centre,	  you	  are	  alone.	  So	  they	  don’t	  have	  any	  contract,	  and	  
this	  was	  the	  beginning;	  because	  of	  this,	  there	  was	  need	  for	  foreign	  investors	  there.	  This	  was	  
the	  beginning,	  either	  way	  they	  cannot	  work.	  I	  tell	  you	  one	  more	  thing,	  very	  important.	  
Please,	  it’s	  important.	  Even	  big	  companies	  like	  Lukoil,	  when	  they	  appear,	  they	  don’t	  know	  
how	  to	  open	  a	  letter	  of	  credit.	  Only	  the	  –	  it	  was	  vacuum,	  you	  must	  understand.	  I’m	  not	  
saying	  they	  are	  dangerous	  in	  the	  country,	  it	  really	  was	  financial	  vacuum:	  no	  banks	  giving,	  
no	  banks	  contact.	  So	  they	  really	  need.	  It’s	  not	  because	  they	  were	  stupid,	  no,	  they	  were	  very	  
clever	  people,	  but	  they	  need	  to	  begin.	  Even	  me	  when	  I	  begin	  to	  learn,	  someone	  teach	  me	  
this	  business.	  I	  do	  no	  learn	  myself”.	  	  	  As	  the	  Georgian	  political	  structure	  acquired	  more	  of	  a	  standing,	  successive	  governments	  took	  steps	  to	  back	  off	  from	  the	  contract	  with	  the	  Claimants.	  Finally,	  using	  the	  procedural	  faults,	   which	   really	   took	   place	   at	   the	   moment	   of	   starting	   the	   Claimants’	   business	   in	  Georgia,	  the	  government	  annulled	  the	  core	  component,	  namely	  the	  Deed	  of	  Concession	  granting	   the	   access	   to	   the	   local	   mineral	   resources,	   and	   to	   the	   corresponding	  infrastructure.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  difference	  of	  the	  Argentinian	  cases,	  here	  the	  government	  didn’t	  really	  reclaim	  the	  privatized	  assets	  as	  such;	  what	  took	  place	  was	  rather	  the	  legitimation,	  from	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government,	  of	  other	  private	  entities	  taking	  the	  business	  out	  of	  the	  Claimants’	  hands.	  A	  similar	  situation,	  i.e.	  an	  example	  of	  the	  entrenchment	  strategy	  from	  the	  part	  of	  the	  government,	  occurred	  in	  the	  case	  of	  OKO	  Pannki	  OYJ,	  VTB	  Bank	  AG,	  and	  Sampo	   Bank	   PLC	   vs	   the	   Republic	   of	   Estonia31.	   Here,	   we	   have	   a	   privatised	   fishing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 ICSID Case No. ARB/04/6 
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company,	  whose	  assets	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  private	  investor	  without	  the	  debts	  that	  had	   been	   burdening	   them	   before	   the	   privatisation.	   This	   is	   a	   classical	   case	   of	   the	  government	   voluntarily	   entrenching	   itself	   in	   quite	   a	   narrow	   scope	   of	   political	   power,	  and	  endorsing	  the	  liabilities,	  which	  should	  have	  been	  paid	  by	  the	  private	  investor.	  	  	  As	   one	   considers	   the	   case	   of	   Europe	   Cement	   Investment	   &	   Trade	   (Claimant)	   vs.	   the	  Republic	  of	  Turkey	   (Respondent)32,	  we	  have	  a	   stable	  democracy,	  namely	  Turkey,	  with	  public	   sovereignty	   resting	  on	  a	   relatively	  well-­‐balanced	  neighbourhood	  of	   equilibrium	  between	   legitimation,	   and	   economic	   power.	   The	   capacity	   of	   the	   government	   for	   both	  sovereign	   acquisition,	   and	   public	   borrowing	   is	   noticeable,	   and	   sustainable.	   In	   such	   a	  case,	  when	  facing	  such	  a	  stable	  state,	  private	  investors	  have	  little	  possibility	  to	  acquire	  public	  assets	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  seriously	  threaten	  public	  sovereignty.	  	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  actual	  cases	  of	  investor-­‐state	  disputes,	  which	  demonstrate	  that	  even	  a	   relatively	   frail	   democracy	   can	  adopt	   a	   relatively	   sound	  policy	   as	   for	   treating	  private	  investors.	   With	   enough	   consideration	   as	   for	   the	   negotiation	   of	   contracts,	   and	   their	  implementation,	   a	   young	   government	   can	   attract	   private	   investors,	   and	   keep	   the	  winning	  hand	   in	  the	  possible	   investor-­‐state	  disputes.	  Lebanon	  is	  a	  good	  example,	  with	  the	  highly	  illustrative	  case	  of	  Toto	  Construzioni	  Generali	  (Claimant)	  vs.	  the	  Republic	  of	  Lebanon	  (Respondent)33.	  
Conclusion:	  the	  TTIP	  and	  investor-­‐state	  disputes	  	  Let’s	  return	  to	  the	  question,	  whether	  the	  prospective	  signing	  of	  the	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  and	   Investment	   Partnership,	   inclusive	   of	   the	   currently	   used	   dispositions	   as	   for	   the	  investor-­‐state	   disputes,	   is	   a	   threat	   to	   democracy	   and	   public	   sovereignty.	   In	   a	   general	  manner,	   it	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be.	  As	  demonstrated	  above,	   investor-­‐state	  disputes	  as	  such	  do	   not	   impend	   public	   sovereignty.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   they	   contribute	   to	   building	   a	  relatively	  coherent	  system	  of	  rules	  as	  for	  settling	  the	  conflicts,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  result	  from	  previous	  breaches	   to	  public	   sovereignty.	  The	  TTIP,	  once	   it	   acquires	  any	  binding	   force,	  will	   involve	  mature,	   stable	  democracies.	  Even	   the	  youngest	  members	  of	   the	  European	  Union,	  namely	  the	  post-­‐communist	  democracies	  of	  Central	  Europe,	  seem	  stable	  enough,	  at	  present,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  inconsiderate,	  massive	  privatisation.	  Thus,	  the	  main	  factor	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/2 
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could	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  sovereignty	  via	  business	  combinations	  seems	  very	  unlikely	  to	  play	  any	  role.	  	  What’s	   important	   to	   understand	   in	   the	   context	   of	   that	   general	   conclusion	   is	   that	   the	  good	  faith	  from	  the	  part	  of	  private	  investors,	  inclusive	  of	  corporate	  responsibility,	  is	  not	  really	   important	   in	   that	   respect.	   Whether	   the	   big,	   transnational	   corporations	   be	  responsible	  or	  irresponsible	  in	  their	  strategies,	  the	  key	  factor	  of	  public	  sovereignty	  vis	  a	  vis	  those	  strategies	  is	  the	  proper	  balance	  between	  legitimation,	  and	  economic	  power	  of	  the	  governments	  in	  place.	  In	  political	  terms,	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  balance	  of	  powers,	  and	  of	  efficiency,	  between	  respectively,	   the	   legislative,	  and	  the	  executive	  branch	  of	   the	  government.	   Especially,	   a	   weak	   legislative,	   coexisting	   with	   a	   highly	   efficient,	   and	  autonomous	   executive	   branch,	   can	   create	   dangerous	   disproportions	   between	  legitimation,	   and	   economic	   power.	   In	   the	   general	   case	   of	   European	   governments,	   the	  most	  likely	  to	  happen	  is	  the	  Ali	  Baba’s	  syndrome.	  If	  the	  executive	  branch	  is	  in	  the	  actual	  possession	   of	   valuable	   assets,	   with	   the	   legislative	   lagging	   behind	   as	   for	   sovereign	  supervision,	   abusive	   transfers	   of	   property	   rights	   may	   take	   place.	   That,	   in	   turn,	   can	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  lost	  disputes	  against	  private	  investors.	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